Varieties of Civilian Oversight: Similarities, Differences, and Expectations

Sue Quinn, NACOLE Board, Revised 12/2004

 

This paper outlines the various oversight models and describes how each can function to improve policing and increase trust between communities and law enforcement. It outlines strengths and weaknesses of each model; identifies predictable challenges faced by civilian oversight; describes the effective and appropriate use of public documents to educate all parties; identifies three critical problems in the oversight process and suggests ways to avoid them.

 

Click here for a printable PDF version of this page.

 

 

Monitor IA / Prof Standards Units Investigations or “Internal” Oversight

Investigate Independently or “External” Oversight

 

An Individual Conducts Oversight

Usually called Auditor, Monitor, Inspector General; Ombudsman; can have various titles.

 

Critical Issues:

-extent of authority and powers;

-how much is the individual controlled or not by Subject Department;

-adequate funding, training, staffing to be credible to department and community;

-adequate outreach;

-adequate listening to all parties, collecting all evidence before analysis;

-respectful; not timid or “co-opted.”

 

Tucson Independent Police Auditor

 

LA PC PD’s Inspector General

LA SD Special Counsel

LA SD Office of Indepndt Review

LA SD Ombudsmn

 

San Jose Independent Police Auditor [with broad powers]

Santa Cruz Auditor

Omaha Public Safety Auditor

Portland, Ore (Independent Police Review; can also investigate)

Sacramento [can also investigate)

Seattle

 

 

 

Tucson Independent Police Auditor participates in IA invs

LA PD’s IG (investigate or monitor)

 

Boise Ombudsman

 

San Jose Independent Police Auditor participates in IA invs

 

Portland, Ore (IPR Invstgt or mntr)

 

Sacramento [invstgt or mntr]

 

A Group Conducts Oversight

Usually a Board or Commission

 

Critical Issues:

-extent of authority and powers;

-how much is Bd/Comm controlled or not by Subject Department;

-adequate funding, training, staffing to be credible to department and community;

-adequate outreach;

-adequate listening to all parties, collecting all evidence before analysis;

-respectful; not timid; not over identified with police or community; not splintered into ineffectiveness by conflict

 

Tucson

Denver (Revision in 2005, adding auditor)

San Diego City

New Haven CONN

Riverside CA

Key West FLA

Prince George’s Co MD

Las Vegas NV

Albany NY

Rochester NY

Eugene, Ore

Portland, Ore (Citizens Review Committee)

Austin, Tx

Seattle

 

Berkeley CA

Denver  (Revision in process)

Long Beach CA

Richmond CA

Riverside CA

San Diego County

San Francisco

Miami-Dade

NY City

Indianapolis

Albuquerque

Cincinnati

Philadelphia

Pittsburgh

 

Functions, Strengths and Weakness of Various Models of Civilian Oversight in the U.S.


Investigative Board/Commission

Monitoring Board/ Commissions

Auditor/Ombudsman  with Broad Powers (power to compel evidence)

Description

A Board / Commission agency which investigates complaints; makes findings; & based on them makes recommendations to the law enforcement administration regarding discipline and/or policy

A Board / Commission which reviews Internal Affairs investigations of complaints; finds them adequate or not; and states whether it agrees or disagrees with the IA findings. It may recommend further investigation; may make policy recommendations.

 

An individual reviews complaints and Internal Affairs investigations. The monitor may also conduct other investigations not generated by complaints.

 

If an IA investigation is deficient, the auditor may ask for further investigation or may conduct an independent investigation

Function

Produce an Investigation; make findings & recommendation; give citizen, the public and department information.

 

 

 

Provide firm, fair, consistent external investigations in order to help law enforcement agency better provide firm, fair, consistent law enforcement services, and better management.

Identify adequate vs inadequate Internal Affairs investigations; direct department to take corrective action. Improve quality of IA Investigations. Make policy recommendations.

 

Provide firm, fair, consistent internal reviews of IA investigations in order to help law enforcement agency better provide firm, fair, consistent law enforcement services, and better management.

Identify, monitor and in some cases investigate problems/ complaints; draw conclusions; make findings/recommendations; conduct audits.

 

 

Provide firm, fair, consistent reviews and/ or investigations in order to help law enforcement agency better provide firm, fair, consistent law enforcement services, and better management.

 

Strengths

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Model can give complainants & community a greater sense of participation and a sense the decision is made outside the PD

 

To maintain its integrity, investigative model needs members/staff with sufficient knowledge, ability and training to conduct competent investigations. In addition, it needs

-ability to compel evidence (subpoena);

-funding sufficient to fully investigate;

-accessible, open public hearings;

-due process for officers.

Model can produce findings faster than investigative model, and can provide more citizens’ input than auditor model.

 

To maintain its integrity, monitoring model needs to have sufficient knowledge, ability and training to identify problems in Internal Affairs investigations.

An auditor can operate more flexibly and freely than a Board; may have a broader mission than monitoring/investigating complaints.

 

Auditor must have the authority to compel evidence from the department, and adequate funding to carry out duties.

 

Weaknesses

Much time/labor required of volunteers.

 

If members/ staff are inadequately skilled and/or trained, poor quality investigations result.

 

Adversarial process.

Much time/labor required of volunteers.

 

If Internal Affairs process is inadequate, and Board is inadequately skilled and/or trained to examine, then Board may not recognize problems in Investigations.

 

Because it works with the IA investigations, this model is more vulnerable to being co-opted, though all models can be. 

Depends on the skills, abilities and commitment of one person. Continuity of quality may become a problem.

 

Public may want more than one person’s oversight.

 

 

 

Predictable Challenges to the Oversight Process in a Community

“If the monitoring influence comes from outside the police, it tends to rouse the opposition of police managers as well as the rank and file; without some cooperation from within, then, it is nearly impossible for the outsiders to investigate, and any policy recommendations they make are liable to be ignored.” Paul Chevigny, Edge of the Knife

 

Expect external monitoring in, especially in its early years, to face opposition from police managers and their political base; and from rank and file officers and their employee organizations. Remember, if oversight processes really were “toothless,” this opposition would be unnecessary. Opposition may include:

·         inadequate funding or subsequent de-funding;

·         disparagement of the Auditor, Board Members or staff;

·         attempts to convince the public that police issues are too complicated for the public to understand;

·         suits from employee groups to stop it;

·         attempts to pack a Board with police supporters or let Boards dwindle so no quorum is possible;

·         pressure to close processes / information dissemination that can be open.

 

The community will expect:

·         An oversight process that is quickly up and running at full speed;

·         If oversight is the result of a vote, people believe that the “work” is over when the election is successful.

 

Expect some community members, be they activists, Board members, staff or elected officials to become exasperated or to burnout when fully operational oversight doesn’t happen fast enough.

 

Minimize the opposition and disappointment by educating all parties to expect the process will take time, and to expect it will face challenges. This does not mean it’s not working; it means it means the work is beginning.

 

Avoid Three Critical Mistakes to Be Credible to Community and Police

 

“The credibility of oversight depends on people conducting oversight being carefully informed. The formula to correct resistance to oversight is utter competence. Your work will create your credibility.”            Merrick Bobb, NACOLE 1999 Conference

 

The 3 critical mistakes persons engaged in any model of oversight must avoid are

·         Failure to be adequately prepared and informed as to the relevant case details and governing policies and laws;

·         Over-identification with the community / complainant;

·         Over-identification with the police.

 

Credible oversight comes from the center of this continuum:

 

Over Identification with Community

Not Identified with Community or Police

Respect toward Both; Constructive Tension

Over Identification with Police

Disrespectful, overheated rhetoric in discussions with police.

Assume police are wrong.

 

Failure to learn the details sufficiently and know the legal issues clearly.

Assume police did what they are accused of.

Fair, firm, consistent dialogue over clearly defined issues.

Respectful without assuming subordinate role.

Unblinking attention to the issues.

 

We model –for police and community--the behavioral changes we seek.

 

Assume that either version may be true,

Exaggerated, falsified or merely mistaken;

 

We do not know until we examine the evidence.

Too cozy with police.

Assume police are right.

Assume military models apply to policing (“It’s war;” “Enemies”).

 

Assume complainants have ulterior motives.

Assume police “could not have” done what they’re accused of.

 

 

To Avoid Over Identification with Community

To Maintain the Middle Ground

To Avoid Over Identification w Police

Recognize & address your biases.

 

Do Ride-a-longs; Attend Academy Classes;

Ask Questions; Read Policies.

 

Obtain the varieties of training described in the middle column

From Mr. Bobb’s comments at the 1999 NACOLE Conference:

 

Obtain training from prosecutors; city/county attorneys; police unions, civil liberties experts and plaintiffs’ attorneys. Learn how they analyze liability cases.

 

Obtain training from force experts; ask doctors & nurses how they evaluate injuries. 

 

Ask judges for training in how they evaluated uncorroborated conflicting testimony.

Learn the discipline system your law enforcement agency uses and how to apply it.

 

Look for patterns.  If you have trouble making a decision, write out the reasons you cannot decide.

 

Do not hesitate to question policies.

Recognize and address your biases.

 

Obtain as much training OUTSIDE the Police Agency as you obtain within the agency;

 

Obtain the varieties of training described in the middle column

 

 

What kind of oversight “really works best?”

 

This is a question NACOLE often hears. The answer isn’t simple. Communities must discover the oversight that will work best for them. Any of the models can work; and any can be co-opted. What all require is this: That the community and its leadership have the integrity and political will to make civilian oversight work. “Work” means that a better, fairer law enforcement process evolves. Citizen satisfaction and officer acceptance grows if the process is recognized as fair. “Political will” means the will of the many community leaders, not just elected officials.

 

Many of our inquirers want a more concrete answer, and ask, “But isn’t there a kind of oversight that really works best?”

We respond, “Yes. What really works is oversight

·         that is independent;

·         that selects people with integrity who will go where facts lead them; 

·         that supplies its overseers with adequate budgets, training and time; and

·         that expects them to listen deeply and to address detailed issues with fairness, patience and compassion for all parties.

 

In the definitive book on police conduct, The Edge of the Knife, Paul Chevigny suggested the effective management of law enforcement requires an adequately funded tri-part oversight system including:

1.      An effective civilian complaint investigation component;

2.      An empowered ombudsman who oversaw the workings of the department and could compel evidence be produced; and

3.      An internal inspector general committed to reform and risk management.

 

Most jurisdictions in the U.S. have only one of parts of this system, sometimes a pseudo-version, hamstrung by inadequate funding, or co-opted by the department it is to oversee.  However, currently we see a trend wherein cities establish multiple components of oversight. Cities that establish multiple components come closest to Chevigny’s ideal system. Examples are Los Angeles County; Philadelphia; Seattle, Tucson, and Denver.

 

Multiple oversight components are not redundant. They fulfill different functions and contribute to the effective management law enforcement agencies.

 

 

Chevigny succinctly summarized why external and internal oversight are needed:

“If the monitoring influence comes from outside the police, it tends to rouse the opposition of police managers as well as the rank and file; without some cooperation from within, then, it is nearly impossible for the outsiders to investigate, and any policy recommendations they make are likely to be ignored. On the other hand, if the control is exclusively internal, it tends to become socialized to existing mores in the department and to be ineffective; this effect is especially strong in the United States where there is little lateral entry. Real accountability will have to combine internal and external controls. Page 267 [Italics added].

 

The specific, concrete needs of oversight--any kind-- are integrity and political will put into transparent actions: budget actions; appointments action; training and reporting actions. When the oversight system has these, it will work.

 

Oversight can only be as good as a community’s sustained commitment to it, and citizens’ sustained, patient commitment to put in hours whether or not the police/community relations are in a crisis.

 

Where and How To Start

When police administrators and supervisors handle officers’ errors or misconduct appropriately, the community is generally satisfied. Typically, communities implement oversight when they believe law enforcement administrators have failed to adequately manage and supervise a department. 

 

Take the problems to the Subject Department and ask to be heard:

·         Become curious about the department. Ask and learn.

·         Learn your Public Records and Public Meeting Laws. Some records are withheld that could be released. They may be released if requested pursuant to the laws.

·         Learn from other jurisdictions.

·         Read the records and reports where oversight is already established;

·         Read the oversight academics’ research and journal articles;

·         Build your local oversight library of resources; help others in your community learn the issues.

 

Construct “institutional memory” of the problems that mobilized you:

·         Begin and maintain a chronology of the kinds and numbers of incidents that have led the community to want oversight;

·         Learn what your jurisdiction is paying in civil liability for police errors or misconduct; and learn how to link oversight to risk management;

·         When the Subject Department makes progress, publicize it.

 

Educate the community about the police, and the police about the community:

·         Do specific outreach to those in your community most apt to have problems with the police; teach them how to behave in police interactions and how an officer is to behave; teach them how to make a complaint; teach them how to be a witness.

 

Prioritize the problems in your jurisdiction:

·         Determine the energy and time limitations of the community members who will work on this. Build your strategies on this. 

Make Good Use of Public Documents and Open Processes:

·         Draft all public documents (Agendas, Minutes, and Reports) recognizing they can and should also function to educate the community and subject department.

·         Read other jurisdictions documents.

·         Learn and share among jurisdictions. 

·         Publicly analyze successes and difficulties.

·         Adopt/ adapt other jurisdictions’ “best practices.”

·         Produce clear, interesting documents, with useful, significant information about oversight and law enforcement. The clearer, more “user friendly” the documents are, the more they will be read, and the more readers will understand and be interested.

 

 

In conclusion, remember:

·         When establishing evaluation processes, be sure to examine if the kinds of incidents or conditions that led to establishing oversight are still occurring. This is critical information.

·         Learn what your jurisdiction is paying in civil liability for police errors or misconduct; and learn how to link oversight to risk management.

·         When the Subject Department makes progress, publicize it.

·         Transparent, interesting, informative reports educate their readers.

·         Educate the community about the police, and the police about the community.

·        Get information regarding how to file complaint and/or commendation onto the Mayor’s, the City Manager’s and the PD’s websites as well as Oversight Agency’s website; make sure anyone can easily link to a description of the complaint process by going to the jurisdiction’s homepage.

Oversight can only be as good as a community’s sustained commitment to it, and citizens’ sustained, patient commitment to put in hours whether or not the police / community relations are in a crisis.  

 

For additional resources, visit NACOLE.org and use the Links/Resources for Oversight.