Varieties of
Civilian Oversight: Similarities, Differences, and Expectations
Sue Quinn, NACOLE Board, Revised 12/2004
This paper outlines the various oversight models and describes
how each can function to improve policing and increase trust between communities
and law enforcement. It outlines strengths and weaknesses of each model;
identifies predictable challenges faced by civilian oversight; describes the effective
and appropriate use of public documents to educate all parties; identifies
three critical problems in the oversight process and suggests ways to avoid
them.
Click here for a printable PDF version of this page.
|
|
|
Investigate Independently or “External”
Oversight |
|
An Individual Conducts Oversight Usually
called Auditor, Monitor, Inspector General; Ombudsman; can have various
titles. Critical Issues: -extent
of authority and powers; -how much
is the individual controlled or not by Subject Department; -adequate
funding, training, staffing to be credible to department and community; -adequate
outreach; -adequate
listening to all parties, collecting all evidence before analysis; -respectful;
not timid or “co-opted.” |
LA PC
PD’s Inspector General LA SD
Special Counsel LA SD
Office of Indepndt Review LA SD
Ombudsmn San Jose
Independent Police Auditor [with broad powers] |
Tucson
Independent Police Auditor participates in IA invs LA PD’s
IG (investigate or monitor) San Jose
Independent Police Auditor participates in IA invs |
|
A Group Conducts Oversight Usually a
Board or Commission Critical Issues: -extent
of authority and powers; -how much
is Bd/Comm controlled or not by Subject Department; -adequate
funding, training, staffing to be credible to department and community; -adequate
outreach; -adequate
listening to all parties, collecting all evidence before analysis; -respectful;
not timid; not over identified with police or community; not splintered into
ineffectiveness by conflict |
|
Miami-Dade NY City |
Functions, Strengths and Weakness of
Various Models of Civilian Oversight in the
|
Investigative
Board/Commission |
Monitoring Board/
Commissions
|
Auditor/Ombudsman with Broad Powers (power to compel
evidence) |
|
|
Description |
A Board /
Commission agency which investigates complaints; makes findings; & based
on them makes recommendations to the law enforcement administration regarding
discipline and/or policy |
A Board /
Commission which reviews Internal Affairs investigations of complaints; finds
them adequate or not; and states whether it agrees or disagrees with the IA
findings. It may recommend further investigation; may make policy
recommendations. |
An
individual reviews complaints and Internal Affairs investigations. The
monitor may also conduct other investigations not generated by complaints. If an IA
investigation is deficient, the auditor may ask for further investigation or
may conduct an independent investigation |
|
Function |
Produce
an Investigation; make findings & recommendation; give citizen, the
public and department information. Provide
firm, fair, consistent external investigations in order to help law enforcement
agency better provide firm, fair, consistent law enforcement services, and
better management. |
Identify
adequate vs inadequate Internal Affairs investigations; direct department to
take corrective action. Improve quality of IA Investigations. Make policy
recommendations. Provide
firm, fair, consistent internal reviews of IA investigations in order to help law enforcement
agency better provide firm, fair, consistent law enforcement services, and
better management. |
Identify,
monitor and in some cases investigate problems/ complaints; draw conclusions;
make findings/recommendations; conduct audits. Provide
firm, fair, consistent reviews and/ or investigations in order to help law enforcement
agency better provide firm, fair, consistent law enforcement services, and
better management. |
|
Strengths |
Model can
give complainants & community a greater sense of participation and a
sense the decision is made outside the PD To
maintain its integrity, investigative model needs members/staff with
sufficient knowledge, ability and training to conduct competent
investigations. In addition, it needs -ability
to compel evidence (subpoena); -funding
sufficient to fully investigate; -accessible,
open public hearings; -due
process for officers. |
Model can
produce findings faster than investigative model, and can provide more
citizens’ input than auditor model. To
maintain its integrity, monitoring model needs to have sufficient knowledge,
ability and training to identify problems in Internal Affairs investigations. |
An
auditor can operate more flexibly and freely than a Board; may have a broader
mission than monitoring/investigating complaints. Auditor
must have the authority to compel evidence from the department, and adequate
funding to carry out duties. |
|
Weaknesses |
Much
time/labor required of volunteers. If
members/ staff are inadequately skilled and/or trained, poor quality
investigations result. Adversarial
process. |
Much
time/labor required of volunteers. If
Internal Affairs process is inadequate, and Board is inadequately skilled
and/or trained to examine, then Board may not recognize problems in
Investigations. Because
it works with the IA investigations, this model is more vulnerable to being
co-opted, though all models can be. |
Depends
on the skills, abilities and commitment of one person. Continuity of quality
may become a problem. Public
may want more than one person’s oversight. |
Predictable Challenges to the
Oversight Process in a Community
“If the
monitoring influence comes from outside the police, it tends to rouse the
opposition of police managers as well as the rank and file; without some
cooperation from within, then, it is nearly impossible for the outsiders to
investigate, and any policy recommendations they make are liable to be ignored.”
Paul Chevigny, Edge of the Knife
Expect
external monitoring in, especially in its early years, to face opposition from
police managers and their political base; and from rank and file officers and
their employee organizations. Remember, if oversight processes really were
“toothless,” this opposition would be unnecessary. Opposition may include:
·
inadequate
funding or subsequent de-funding;
·
disparagement
of the Auditor, Board Members or staff;
·
attempts
to convince the public that police issues are too complicated for the public to
understand;
·
suits
from employee groups to stop it;
·
attempts
to pack a Board with police supporters or let Boards dwindle so no quorum is
possible;
·
pressure
to close processes / information dissemination that can be open.
The
community will expect:
·
An
oversight process that is quickly up and running at full speed;
·
If
oversight is the result of a vote, people believe that the “work” is over when
the election is successful.
Expect some
community members, be they activists, Board members, staff or elected officials
to become exasperated or to burnout when fully operational oversight doesn’t
happen fast enough.
Minimize
the opposition and disappointment by educating all parties to expect the
process will take time, and to expect it will face challenges. This does not
mean it’s not working; it means it means the work is beginning.
Avoid Three Critical Mistakes to Be Credible to
Community and Police
“The credibility of oversight
depends on people conducting oversight being carefully informed. The formula to correct resistance to
oversight is utter competence. Your work will create your credibility.” Merrick
Bobb, NACOLE 1999 Conference
|
Over Identification with Community |
Not Identified with Community or
Police Respect toward Both; Constructive
Tension |
Over Identification with Police
|
|
Disrespectful, overheated rhetoric in discussions with
police. Assume police are wrong.
Failure to learn the details sufficiently and know the
legal issues clearly. Assume police did what they are accused of. |
Fair, firm, consistent dialogue over clearly defined issues. Respectful without assuming subordinate role. Unblinking attention to the issues.
We model –for police and community--the behavioral changes we seek.
Assume that either version may be true, Exaggerated, falsified or merely mistaken;
We do not know until we examine the
evidence. |
Too cozy with police. Assume police are right. Assume military models apply to policing (“It’s war;”
“Enemies”)
Assume complainants have ulterior motives. Assume police “could not have” done what they’re accused
of. |
|
To Avoid Over Identification with Community |
To Maintain the Middle Ground |
To Avoid Over Identification w Police
|
|
Recognize & address your biases. Do Ride-a-longs; Attend Academy Classes; Ask Questions; Read Policies. Obtain the varieties of training described in the middle
column |
From Mr. Bobb’s comments at the 1999 NACOLE Conference: Obtain training from prosecutors; city/county attorneys; police unions,
civil liberties experts and plaintiffs’ attorneys. Learn how they analyze
liability cases. Obtain training from force experts; ask doctors & nurses how they
evaluate injuries. Ask judges for training in how they evaluated uncorroborated
conflicting testimony. Learn the discipline system your law enforcement agency uses and how to
apply it. Look for patterns. If you have
trouble making a decision, write out the reasons you cannot decide. Do not hesitate to question policies. |
Recognize and address your biases. Obtain as much training OUTSIDE the Police Agency as you
obtain within the agency; Obtain the varieties of training described in the middle
column |
What
kind of oversight “really works best?”
This is a question NACOLE often hears. The
answer isn’t simple. Communities must discover the oversight that will work
best for them. Any of the models can work; and any can be co-opted. What all
require is this: That the community and its leadership have the integrity
and political will to make civilian oversight work. “Work” means that a
better, fairer law enforcement process evolves. Citizen satisfaction and
officer acceptance grows if the process is recognized as fair. “Political will”
means the will of the many community leaders, not just elected officials.
Many of
our inquirers want a more concrete answer, and ask, “But isn’t there a kind of
oversight that really works best?”
We respond, “Yes. What really
works is oversight
·
that is independent;
·
that selects people with integrity who will go where facts lead
them;
·
that supplies its overseers with adequate budgets, training and time;
and
·
that expects them to listen deeply and to address detailed issues with
fairness, patience and compassion for all parties.
In the
definitive book on police conduct, The Edge of the Knife, Paul Chevigny
suggested the effective management of law enforcement requires an adequately
funded tri-part oversight system including:
1. An effective civilian complaint
investigation component;
2. An empowered ombudsman who oversaw
the workings of the department and could compel evidence be produced; and
3. An internal inspector general
committed to reform and risk management.
Most
jurisdictions in the
Multiple
oversight components are not redundant. They fulfill different functions and
contribute to the effective management law enforcement agencies.
Chevigny
succinctly summarized why external and internal oversight are needed:
“If the monitoring influence comes from outside the police,
it tends to rouse the opposition of police managers as well as the rank and
file; without some cooperation from within, then, it is nearly impossible for
the outsiders to investigate, and any policy recommendations they make are
likely to be ignored. On the other hand, if the control is exclusively
internal, it tends to become socialized to existing mores in the department and
to be ineffective; this effect is especially strong in the
The
specific, concrete needs of oversight--any kind-- are integrity and political will
put into transparent actions: budget actions; appointments action; training and
reporting actions. When the oversight system has these, it will work.
Oversight
can only be as good as a community’s sustained commitment to it, and citizens’
sustained, patient commitment to put in hours whether or not the
police/community relations are in a crisis.
Where and How To Start
When police
administrators and supervisors handle officers’ errors or misconduct
appropriately, the community is generally satisfied. Typically, communities
implement oversight when they believe law enforcement administrators have
failed to adequately manage and supervise a department.
Take the
problems to the Subject Department and ask to be heard:
·
Become
curious about the department. Ask and learn.
·
Learn
your Public Records and Public Meeting Laws. Some records are withheld that
could be released. They may be released if requested pursuant to the laws.
·
Learn
from other jurisdictions.
·
Read
the records and reports where oversight is already established;
·
Read
the oversight academics’ research and journal articles;
·
Build
your local oversight library of resources; help others in your community learn
the issues.
Construct
“institutional memory” of the problems that mobilized you:
·
Begin
and maintain a chronology of the kinds and numbers of incidents that have led
the community to want oversight;
·
Learn
what your jurisdiction is paying in civil liability for police errors or
misconduct; and learn how to link oversight to risk management;
·
When
the Subject Department makes progress, publicize it.
Educate the
community about the police, and the police about the community:
·
Do
specific outreach to those in your community most apt to have problems with the
police; teach them how to behave in police interactions and how an officer is
to behave; teach them how to make a complaint; teach them how to be a witness.
Prioritize
the problems in your jurisdiction:
·
Determine
the energy and time limitations of the community members who will work on this.
Build your strategies on this.
·
Draft
all public documents (Agendas, Minutes, and Reports) recognizing they can and
should also function to educate the community and subject department.
·
Read
other jurisdictions documents.
·
Learn
and share among jurisdictions.
·
Publicly
analyze successes and difficulties.
·
Adopt/
adapt other jurisdictions’ “best practices.”
·
Produce clear, interesting documents, with useful,
significant information about oversight and law enforcement. The clearer, more “user friendly” the documents are, the more they will
be read, and the more readers will understand and be interested.
In conclusion, remember:
·
When
establishing evaluation processes, be sure to examine if the kinds of incidents
or conditions that led to establishing oversight are still occurring. This is
critical information.
·
Learn
what your jurisdiction is paying in civil liability for police errors or
misconduct; and learn how to link oversight to risk management.
·
When
the Subject Department makes progress, publicize it.
·
Transparent,
interesting, informative reports educate their readers.
·
Educate
the community about the police, and the police about the community.
·
Get
information regarding how to file complaint and/or commendation onto the
Mayor’s, the City Manager’s and the PD’s websites as well as Oversight Agency’s
website; make sure anyone can easily link to a description of the complaint
process by going to the jurisdiction’s homepage.
Oversight can only be as good as a
community’s sustained commitment to it, and citizens’ sustained, patient
commitment to put in hours whether or not the police / community relations are
in a crisis.
For
additional resources, visit NACOLE.org and use the Links/Resources for Oversight.